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Sheldon S. Wolin 
I must begin my talk with an apology. It is very presump加ousfor 
a guest from another country who, when he is invited to address his 
hosts, proceeds to force them to listen as he lectures them about the 
pohtics of his own country. My dtlemma 1s, of course, that I am probab-
ly more ignorant of the politics of Japan than most members of甘us
audience are about the politics of the United States. I shal try and 
resolve the dtlemma by dis叩 ssingAmencan pohlics in the context of a 
problem that is familiar to both societies, the problem of modemiza世on
or, more precisely, the problem of post-modernity One more note of 
apology Realizing曲目 I田nalso a guest in a Christian university叩 d
that a text is阻 appropriatebe脚ning,I have chosen a text but, un-
fortunately, 1t 1s from a writer whom many Christians regard with alarm, 
Karl Marx. Perhaps I may be forgiven because I have selected a text 
which Marx wrote before he became a Marxist. Whtle he was st迎a
graduate student he wrote these lines：“Phtlosophy 1s becoming more 
worldly, and the world is becoming more philosophical.”I should hke 
you to try and remember these lines as I discuss the phenomenon of 
“post-modernity” 
If we take“philosophy”m a broader sense than usual and use 1t to 
signぜy“theoreticalknowledge" it becomes apparent that the high pres-
tige which such knowledge enioys is a distinctively modern phenomenon. 
Theoretical knowledge is associated pre-eminently with ma吐iematicsand 
the natural sciences, but 1t has also been self-consciously pursued among 
吐iesocial sciences. Aod at血ecurrent moment “theory”is al也erage in 
the humanities or literary studies. Indeed, ever since吐ieAge of the 
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Enlightenment in the West, modernity has been closely identified with 
the development and exp皿 SJonof“theory”and, above al, with making 
“自eory”ofpractical u田.The田凱lithas been the development of al 
so巾 oftechnologi白，notonly in industrial production, or in agriculture, 
but in health care, medical science, warfare, pop叫arculture (as in 
movies, photography, and later developments), education, transporta-
ti on，阻dcommunicat10n. In the United States Americans are even 
“blessed”by “electromc ministers.”Thus we hve m a world created by 
theory. 
Modernity was more, however，白叩 thepractic叫 applicatlonof 
theoretical knowledge to daily life. It was the promi田 ofa more equit-
able distribution of the material and spiritual or cultural values which 
knowledge would make available. Modernity was thus the promise of a 
just society. We might say也atMarχand other 19th century socialists 
represen臼dthis aspect of modernity. 
Modernity was also, however, a political promJSe of greater individual 
freedom, the equalization of political rights, and the creation of represen-
!alive government and the consequent democratizat10n not only of 
elections but of politics generally If Ma四 was世田 symbolof economic 
and social justice, John Stuart Mill was the symbol of liberal political 
values and the poten!ial democratization of politics. Both writers shared 
a common behef rn the plasticity of the world and a cri!ical conception 
of由eory.
The growing popul町ityof 世田 phrase “post-moder凶ty” or “post~
modernism”恒也eU.S. is a sign that in some sense modernity IS fm-
ished，也atits projects have ei也erbeen fulfilled or they have proved 
impossible to realize, and that so-calied “advanced societies”are under-
going a new evolutionary change.τ'hus 3ustice, for ex町nple,is no longer 
considered to be ・agoal to be realized but, at best, a strategy for buying 
off social discontent; or democracy has been rendered皿achroillS!ic
because a truly modern society depends upon expert decision-making. 
Significantly, Nietzsche, not Marx or Mill, is now也ep出icipaltext in 
m四yAmeric皿 colleges皿duniversities. 
I W副itnow to turn to American politics and to ex田ninem what 
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sense, if any, that polit1cs 1s beg泊n加Eto display the symptoms of post-
modermty. 
The election of an American president is of泊terestto也epeoples 
of other countnes, not only because the successful candidate will become 
head of what is arguably st世 thesingle most powerful country加 the
world, but because that country has symbolized as perhaps no other has 
the “modern”and its vanous prom包es,political, economic, and social. 
The election is talc泊gplace, as perhaps everyone is aw町・e,at a time when 
the Umted States is confronted by m回 ydifficult problems, foreign and 
domestic. Foremost田nong血eformer is the question of relat10nships 
wi世1the Soviet Union m the age of glasnost and perestroika. Then there 
田ethe unresolved problems of the Middle East, of Central America, 
South Africa, and last, but by no me叩sleast, trade policy wi也 Japan.
Domestic quest10ns are the relatively familiar ones of田signmgpnorities 
田nongnational defense, social services, education, and environmental 
protec世on.
At first glance出eseproblems appear to be very much the s田 eas 
吐10sewhich have been dIScussed in American politics since the end 
of the Vietnam War. There iS, however, one major difference. As more 
Americ皿sa田 begmmngto田cogn包e叩 das most other peoples have 
already recognized, Amenc四 powerin its various forms political, 
economic, and military, and one nught add, its ideological appeal-is 
appreciably les than what it was dunng世間 qu町ter-century也atfol-
lowed the end of World War JI. Th恒fact,especially田 itis expressed in 
the superior economic perform叩 ceof countnes such as Japan, West 
Germany, and South Korea, has produced an increasmg pe田町田mamong 
large numbers of middle and workmg clas Americ叩 swho are experienc-
ing a profound reversal担 theirexpectat10ns For about two centuries 
it has been an article of fai自由nongAmericans也at也efu加reW出
bound to be better也叩thep田t，也atone’s children wo叫dexperience a 
more prosperous condition也阻也eirparen恒 andsu問lybe better 
educated. Most Americans now know廿iat,except for the wealthy few, 
that prospect has diminished. Housing, education, and health care, and 
the e吋oymentof natural environments, to talce only these examples, 
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are becommg scarce values阻 dthen quality is clearly lower th叩 before.
Pessllllism, then, is the product of a narrowed future, more constrained, 
even more regulated. 
These tendencies, I would claim, are also evident泊白etype of 
candidate now C白羽paign担gfor the presidency If one reflects back on 
the presidential candidates of the past twenty years or more, it seems 
apparent血at世間reare fewer contras臼 betweenthem than between 
earlier candidates. In 1964 it was Johnson, the great ch町npionof the 
welfare state, against Goldwater, an arch-conservative. In 1968 it was 
the cla田icAmerican hberal, Hubert H山nphrey,ag泊nst吐iesupreme 
pragmatist, Richard Nixon. In 1972 it was Nixon，血esymbol of the 
Vietnam War, against McGovern，也esupreme hberal阻 dthe symbol of 
opposition to that war. In 1976 it was the cautious liberal, Carter, 
ag田nst世田 cautiousconservative Ford. In 1980也esame Carter ag副nst
the radically conservative Reagan. And in 1984 Reagan against出e
traditional American mid-Western liberal, Mondale 
At the present moment, however, it is not contr田tsor differences 
that confront the Amencan voter but puzzlement. One candidate, 
George Bush, has not only occupied every kind of rnaior office m Amen-
C四 politics,but he has also adopted virtually every political position 
也atseemed expedient, e.g., on abortion, civil rights, Reaganomics, and 
arms-for-hostages. He is血eAmerican patncian as pohtical oppor加nist,
a man of decent instmcts, perhaps, but of too many posit10ns, closer, 
by expediency, t刀Nixon血anto Reagan. 
The o血ercandidate, Michael Dukak1s, is widely perce町edas a techno・
crat, a m阻 oftoo few ra吐ier由antoo m叩ypositions ‘℃ompetence” 
is claimed as h恒virtue.The first true technocrat to run for office smce 
Herbert Hoover in 1928, Duk心也 symbolizesthe technocratic田ipulse
to reduce politics to policies so血atit becomes a matter of choosing 
rationally, that is, of choosing the policy which will not only produce 
the desired con田quen田sbut do it more efficiently in terms of r田ources.
Where Bush is reputed to have some of the s面neindifference toward 
detail as Ronald Reagan, Dukakis apparently has a passion for detail 
rather白血 forclarifying the ends for which power is being used and 
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policies adopted 
Each candidate has, however, his own special ghost, a ghost who, 
unlike the ghost of Hamlet’s白血er,is being laid to rest but whose 
bunal is, for由atre田on,of some significance to our topic the ghosts 
are pre modern George Bush strives to present him田町田 thesuccessor 
to Ronald Reagan but this obscures the extent to which he is 吋ecting
a dIStinctive part of Reagamsm, a pre-modem part.百10ininutable 
gemus of Reag叩 wasto present two contradictory faces to the American 
public and to persuade it血atthey were not contradictory. One face, 
a p四四modemface, looked nostalg1cally to the past and spoke of s加.pie
vaiues of neighborliness, family, religious piety, hard work, and pat” 
riotism This voice created a myth of American collective identity, 
a virtuous, deservmg, and nmocent people The other face looked to 
the future叩 dit spoke, not about innocence but about the reai basIS of 
American power m science, advanced technology, and exp叩 dedmilitary 
power. This face exhorted Americans to embrace the values and risks of 
a high tech soc10ty wi也 itsendless innovations，自ercecompetition, i白
basis in scientific research (rather th叩 relig10n).This face spoke of 
constant change, not of eternal or secure values and it praised the very 
forces of modernization that were busily undercutting the values which 
the other face had so eloquently praised. If one face spoke a pre-modem 
l阻 guageof changeless values，也isface spoke a post-modem l四guage
of science皿dtechnology and of forms of power which seemed divorced 
from moral and political valu田，foundat1ortless.
One of也edistinguishing marks of George Bush’S C田npaignis that he 
has made very litle effort to hnitate the first face of Reaganism, the face 
which speaks of trad1t10nal values. There c叩 belitle doubt that Bush 
speaks more comfortably when he, too,. spe此sfrom the second face, 
the post-modern face. The fact由athe can dispen田 soeasily with the 
conception of collective identlty profe田edby the first face suggests how 
artlfic1al the original fabrication was. But it also suggests that we are 
moving mto an era m which the old leg1timatmg myths no longer seem so 
necessary. We might say, that politics is emulating deconstructionist叩 d
post-structuralist modes of thought. Political myths, like the fiction of 
6 
narrative umty, of the autonomous text, or the sovereign author, have 
been dISsolved the world, indeed, may be becoming more philosophical, 
a place of fewer myths and fewer p四回ppos1t10ns.It might me阻， too,
however, fewer consolat10ns and that might be a serious matter if, as 
I have suggested earlier, post-modernity looms as a condition oflowered 
expectations and greater pess田1ism.
The Dukakis candidacy has had its ghost but it was laid to rest only 
after a harsh confrontation. This ghost w回目presentedby Jesse Jackson. 
It is now、旧delyacknowledged, even by Jackson’s critics, that his c町時
P田gnar叩 sedthe American voting public as no recent candidate, includ-
ing Ronald Reagan, h田.A truly sharp set of alternatives was presented; 
a rhetoric was employed that reflected a different Amenca, an America 
of strets, ghettoes, of cultures ravaged by drug abuse, of marginal 
pop凶ationsmostly umnoved by either face of Reaganism. The Jackson 
ghost W田 thespecter of a divided Amenca divided by worsening dis-
pari世間 betweenrich and poor, educated and uneducated, whites and 
non-whites. And he was the only candidate who, by his sympatlues 
with the plight of Third World nations, with the vic出1sof apartheid, 
with Palestinians, and with the populations of Central America ty-
r町田izedby military cliques mostly supported by American power, 
threatened to m品目 foreignpolicy and defense strategy issues in血e
camp副gn.百四harsh,even humiliating, r句ectionof Jackson by Dukakis 
and by other unportant Democratic politicians was a more nnportant 
fact than the mathema祖国 ofelections m 世田 UnitedStates which 
“proved”Jackson could not wm The rise of a technocratic candidate 
and the 吋ectionof a black candidate who, curiously represented the 
values of an earlier modernity-equality, brotherhood, non-discrirnina-
tion, social justice-was further evidence of the evolution toward 
post-modernity, an indica世onof the cooler, more rallonal politics it 
would bring and of也eacceptan田 ofpermanent forms of social mequal・ 
ity as a fact of life to be treated symptomatically m白erthan radically. 
One of the most cunous and revealingおaturesof the campaign也us
far has been the widespread complaint of commentators and of ordinary 
citizens that, despite election coverage in the var10us med抱noone seems 
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confident that he “knows”the candidates. Th担complamtcoming at 
a time when Americans are being treated to the most detailed descrip-
tions of the medical and psychological condition of c皿也dates,their 
personal finances，世田恒timateH自己 of廿ierf;町出es，叩d,of course, th出
sexual adventures and marital problems, makes one wonder what else 
would be needed for Americans to know them Clearly some世tingmore 
1s missmg from世間 C田np血gnand the citizen w阻 tsthe candidate to 
re田surehim or her that what is missmg 1s really吐1ere
I want to suggest that吐出compl剖nthas to do with the disappearance 
of meaning from political life, a disappearance that is closely related to 
its opposite, the technocratic p即時nceof也etwo mam candidates 
Simply put, citizens w皿tmore“represented”by politics血anpost-
modem politics can supply. A rational politics 1s mevitably a reduc-
tionist politi回：itmust qu阻 tify,simplify, abstract if its choices are to be 
clarified and processed. The citizen has, however, symbolic needs as well 
as material mterests. He or she w阻tsthe power of the state to represent 
more血血 rationalefficiency. He or she 1s concerned about purposes, 
common goals, about the point of sacrifice, about the widely perceived 
corruption which 抗日 fearedpervades the political system and about the 
omnipresence of money in politics, and not least during elections. 
But if there is one thing出atthe contemporary politician fmds it 
difficult to do 1t is to“represent.”There are m肌yreasons for this. 
The frst task of a politician is to win an election; and the frst principle 
of wmning an election 1s not to lose it This 問中iresthe politician not 
to alienate potential supporters by representing an interest to which they 
are opposed. But the complexity of most constituencies makes it im-
possible血atsome sign出C阻tgroups of voters w出 notbe alienated 
by any stand other than their own.百tismeans further也atthe relation-
ship of candidates to therr const1tuen回目 1sfar different than the one 
imagined by modem liberal theorists. Liberal也eoristsas四 medthat a 
candidate would be in close叩 ntactwi由也ecit包enryand that his views 
would be responsive to their’s, even be a distillation of them. According 
to this conception the rep日間ntallvewould be shaped by the citizenry, 
but today it is the other way round. The representa世veseeks to shape 
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the citizen, shape him or her into a voter, that 1s, into世田kindof being 
who responds to the sounds and llages of the media. Thanks to廿le
institutions of commerc1al advertizing廿lemedia excels at the homogeni-
zation of出evoter who 1s treated困mplyas the con四merm another 
guise. 
Thus the advance of modernization m politics eliminates the major 
pilar of modem liberal politics, the p出arof representation. Not only 
legislatures and political parties were supposed to be agencies of repre・
sentation, but so was也eexecutive or president. The assumption of 
earlier politics was that there existed cert国nmatters of “common con-
cern”about which elected representatives and officials would deliberate 
m order to discover what the common good reqmred. The post-modern 
version of politi田 sees白epolitics of representation replaced by the 
politics of administration and the common good by the notion of rational 
choice. Ideally a post-modern system would represent rationality, ra世間
than the interests or needs of citizens. This development has been pre-
pa田dby so同called“votingstudies" which have replaced the citizen by 
the voter and then found the voter to be unsuited for political partlcipa-
lion. The voter was discovered to be ignorant, prejudiced, and apa也etic.
In short, using allegedly scientific methods, social scientists declared that 
吐日 voterrepresented吐iemational and hence a potential danger to吐10
processes of rational decision-making which a modernizing society was 
dedicated to perfecting・Thesystem is said to work more efficiently 
when voters do not p町ticipatefor then decision-makers are freer to take 
dec1s1ons undistracted by electoral mandates or by a concerned citizenry 
looking over the shoulders of oficials. 
What role is political theory playing in吐tisevolution toward the 
post匂modem? One role is powerful, influential but uncritical. It is 
represented by the popularity of rational choice theory. It has developed 
a common language for academics and bureaucrats, the language of 
“policy.”It connects not only the academy with governmental bureac” 
racy but each of these with the system of corporate power. The massive 
structures within which rationality is to operate do not allow for vis10ns 
of radical change: the plasticity of the world has disappeared and theory 
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has found a comfortable home担 aworld it has helped to make. Ra-
tional choice si伊ifiesa world become philosophical. 
恒国阻担 alsoanother role being played by theory. Earlier I noted 
that Nietzsche rather than Marx or Mill has become世田m句orinspiration 
副nongmany American academics Nietzsche 1s a profoundly radical 
teacher and a very pessimistic one. Most of h!S American interpreters 
have attended primarily to the Nietzschean claim也atal也eoriesare 
“interpreta世ons＇’目白 er白血 truthsestablished with reference to some 
neutral standard There are no neutral standards for Nietzsche because 
every tru吐1-cl田m is the expression of a“will-to・power，” ofa natural 
impulse toward mastery. To interpret, therefore, is to decode a strategy 
of domination. Many Amencan scholars are now bustly applying 
Nietzschean in図位低 asdeveloped by deconstructionists and post-
structuralists, to世田 codeswhich compose“culture”： codes of gender, 
race, elite culture, economic transactions, and political domination. 
Here we might say that philosophy remains critical and worldly. Yet 
one must also say也at血etendency 1s empty, negative，皿ddestructive 
And it is difficult to see how it will be possible to get beyond that point 
because of the fundamental as四mptionfrom which these tendencies 
operate: if al吐日onesare merely吐ieexpr田sionofa w丑1-to-power，吐ien
clearly these Nietzschean tendencies are not exempt. Two consequences 
follow one, at stake is merely another academic “battle of the books”， 
another academic faslnon of no special political relevance The other 
con田quenceis quite different: the discreditation of values works in favor 
of the tendencies toward diminished me叩泊gwhich I remarked upon 
earlier as bemg an element in post-modern politics. The Nietzscheans 
thus become the alies of也erationalists’w迎ーtopower in the project 
of simplifying the world and reducing the population of meaning・
Are there，也en,no possibilities in post-modern politics and political 
theory that allow for hope, even radical hope? I think that there are but 
也at也eycannot be found within post-modernism, either as theory or 
practtce. Rather we must look to what contradicts吐1epost-modern, 
even subverts it. 
What contradicts世田 post-modernis the archaic, and what has been 
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rendered archaic by世田 post-modernIS democracy, not so much the 
democracy of elections, political parties, but the democracy of sponta-
neous forms of collective action by which ordinary citizens cooperate 
to meet common needs and felt injustices. It is a politics of improV1sed 
fo口ns,a politics也atcreates its own terms of engagement. It is sym-
bolized, I th担k，血arecent article by a columnist in也eWASHINGTON 
POST who w田 concernedto criticize也ePolish Solidanty movement for 
stubbornly challenging也ePolish state with demands which it could 
not meet. In the course of his argi即時nthe compared Solidarity to 
a fainous incident early in World War I when Polish cavalry mounted 
on horseback foolishly attacked German tanks To也ecorrespondent 
it seemed like the absurd effort of the past to conquer也efuture. 
But while I would not advise the use of horses against t回虫色Iwould 
claim也atif we take the horse as a symbol of traditional resources, and 
we th担kof Solidarity as combining the traditional values of love of 
country, religion，血ecompanionship of those who work together and 
live m吐1esame place, as well as the values of free association and free 
thought which世田 Commun1Stversion of moder血 ationhad crushed, 
then maybe the cavalryman and the t田tkare叩 appropriate加age
because it has been a consistent policy of Solidarity not to attack the 
State or Communism directly but ra也erto protest血ermonohth1c 
character.官官 horse,we 即位tsay, is not the symbol of irrationality 
but of也efree spirit which needs space to expre田 itsown form of 
beauty叩 dpower It 1s no match for世田tankin a head・ on confronta-
tion, yet the tank c剖motcrush it. The spirit of Solidarity has persisted 
because 1t is not abstract but grounded in chverse, even conflicting 
traditions, values, and practices. It represen包acultural richness which 
modernizing socie世es,whether communist or capitalist, find to be 
archaic and hence dysfunctional. And this may point to the crucial 
political question facing societies in the transition to post-modernity: 
is c叫加国tobe tended or rationalized? 
Note：官tisspecial lecture was delivered at ICU during the convocation 
hour on September 22, 1988. 
